## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

				25 July 1980	
					,
	MEMORANDUM F	OR: Director of Deputy Director	f Central Intell ector of Central	igence . Intelligence	
•	THROUGH	: Deputy Dire	ector for Nation	nal Foreign Assessment	
	FROM	National I	ntelligence Off	icer for East Asia	
	SUBJECT	: Warning As	sessment: East	Asia	!
	The fol	llowing items we at the 23 July W	ere discussed by Varning Meeting.	the Community Repre-	,
	sentatives a			·	,
	campaign," has been re	during which scortaited.	ores of public of However, Chon menopening of un	General Chon's "purification officials have been dismissed, nust soon deal with the niversities, which will offer	
	to the mili workable pa	tary's growing or ertner in fashion	disillusionment ning a new const	Analysts also called attention with President Choi as a citution and government.	2
	to the mili workable pa  3. No the DMZ rem analysts we Korean poli visit to Py	ertner in fashion orth Korea: On mained at normal ere hesitant to icy shifts based yongyong. Expre	disillusionment ning a new const the military sid levels over the make preliminary on only sketchy ssions of unhap	With President Chor as a	2
	to the mili workable pa  3. No the DMZ rem analysts we Korean poli visit to Py	ertner in fashion orth Korea: On the mained at normal are hesitant to the standard and the standard are hesitant to the standard are hesitant are standard are sta	disillusionment ning a new const the military sid levels over the make preliminary on only sketchy ssions of unhap	de, activity in the area of past 80 days. Politically, y judgments on possible North y reports of Congressman Solarz's	2
	to the mili workable pa  3. No the DMZ rem analysts we Korean poli visit to Py	ertner in fashion orth Korea: On mained at normal ere hesitant to icy shifts based yongyong. Expre	disillusionment ning a new const the military sid levels over the make preliminary on only sketchy ssions of unhap	de, activity in the area of past 80 days. Politically, y judgments on possible North y reports of Congressman Solarz's	
	to the mili workable pa  3. No the DMZ rem analysts we Korean poli visit to Py	ertner in fashion orth Korea: On mained at normal ere hesitant to icy shifts based yongyong. Expre	disillusionment ning a new const the military sid levels over the make preliminary on only sketchy ssions of unhap	de, activity in the area of e past 80 days. Politically, y judgments on possible North y reports of Congressman Solarz's piness about the visit by the	2
	to the mili workable pa  3. No the DMZ rem analysts we Korean poli visit to Py	ertner in fashion orth Korea: On mained at normal ere hesitant to icy shifts based yongyong. Expre	disillusionment ning a new const the military sid levels over the make preliminary on only sketchy ssions of unhap	de, activity in the area of e past 80 days. Politically, y judgments on possible North y reports of Congressman Solarz's piness about the visit by the	

Approved For Release 2005/03/24 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000300070002-5

		7
	4. Indochina: Analysts described a continuing series of	
	incursions into Thai territory by SRV forces directed at DK resupply	
	points. While these penetrations have been relatively shallow, the	
	points. While these penetrations have been relatively successful troops at Ran	
	attacks have been much larger than the one several weeks ago at Ban	
	Mak Mun. Analysts believe the Thai have avoided giving publicity to	•
	the attacks because they are concerned that the extent of their	
	support for the DK will become public.	2
	5. Analysts also indicated that DK forces have moved deeper	;
	into Kampuchea from base areas close to the Thai border and, as	- 1
	reflected in PAVN communications, have begun to raise PAVN concerns.	,
	reflected in PAVN communications, have begun to read the Sing-Vietnamese	· {
	Heightened Chinese military activity along the Sino-Vietnamese	
	border was noted, along with more concrete expressions of Chinese	
	support for Thailand in the event of a major PAVN attack.	2
	. <u></u>	
	6. Indonesia: There was agreement that relations between	
	Indonesia and the US have taken a turn for the worse. The Indonesians	
	have grown increasingly irritated with a series of policies which have	
	resulted from among other things a cutback of PL480 aid, cuts and	
	slow delivery of FMS, and a decision not to provide prior notification	
	of passage of US vessels through such Indonesian-claimed waters as	
	of passage of US vessers through such indonestall-claimed waters us	
	the Straits of Lombok. The impasse has not yet reached the critical	
	stage, but there was concern that the Indonesians may interpret these	
	policies as growing US indifference to East Asía and a signal that	
	they should adjust their posture toward the Soviets.	2
	7. China: The pattern of political maneuverings prior to high-level	
	meetings later this year which was commented on last month has continued.	
	Analysts also commented on evidence of differences among Chinese leaders	
	who, while firmly committed to modernization, have conflicting views on	r ==
	how to attain this goal centralized control of the economy along Soviet	
	lines vs. decentralization combined with enhanced material incentives	
	and elements of a market economy. Although analysts believed that those	
	and elements of a market economy. Arthough analysis series they	
	favoring the latter course were presently in the ascendency, they	2
	looked to the upcoming high-level meetings to provide a fuller picture.	
		_
	Distribution	2
	Distribution Company 1 PCT	
	Copy 1 - DCI	
	2 - DDCI	
	3 - ER	
	4 - DD/NFA	
	5 - DD/NFAC	
	6 - SACI/NFAC	
	7 - NFAC Action Staff	
	8 - NIO/W	
	·	
	9 - NIO/EA Chrono	
1	10 - NIO/EA File	_
-	11 - NFAC Registry	2
	2 25 July 1980	
	SECRET	

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt